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 Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the*
Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________
No. 07-4128
_________
BARKER-PUZA, ET AL,
  
v.
CARBON COUNTY, ET AL
ESTATE OF STEPHEN PUZA, JR.,
LEAH PUZA, REBECCA FOX,
STEPHEN PUZA III & SARA PUZA,
                                    
      Appellants
___________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
No. 03-CV-02183
(District Judge: The Honorable James Munley) 
Filed: December 17, 2008
___________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 30, 2008
Before: McKEE, NYGAARD, and SILER, Circuit Judges*
2OPINION OF THE COURT
McKee, Circuit Judge,
The Estate of Stephen Puza, along with several surviving family members, appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of individual and county defendants in an
action plaintiffs brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law.  For the reasons
that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We need not recite a detailed factual or procedural history because we write primarily for
the parties who are already familiar with this case.  Stephen Puza (“Puza”) committed suicide
while in the custody of Lansford Pennsylvania Police at the Carbon County jail.   The plaintiffs
brought a § 1983 action against Carbon County and several individual correction officers, and a
negligence action against the jail’s architects.  
Appellants make several arguments on appeal.  However, the main issue is whether the
district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the
defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Our review is plenary.  Kaucher v.
County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006).
 In order to survive summary judgment with regard to the individual defendants, a
plaintiff must present evidence that would allow a rational fact finder to conclude, “(1) the
detainee had a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide,’ (2) the custodial officer or officers knew or
should have known of that vulnerability, and (3) those officers ‘acted with reckless indifference’
to the detainee's particular vulnerability.”  Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)
3(“Colburn II”)).  
The district court granted summary judgment to the individual correction officers because
the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of their subjective appreciation of a particular
vulnerability to suicide.  2007 WL 2852343, at *9. The particular vulnerability “speaks to the
degree of risk inherent in the detainee’s condition . . . . [T]here must be a strong likelihood,
rather than a mere possibility, that self-inflicted harm will occur.” Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1024
(citation and internal quotations omitted).  Plaintiffs point to Puza’s erratic mood swings, his
intoxication, and the circumstances that resulted in his arrest in arguing that they have produced
evidence of the strong likelihood that Puza intended to harm himself.   However, those
circumstances - while prophetic in hindsight - suggest only the “mere possibility” that Puza
posed a suicide risk.  See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 322-23 (finding no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether a pre-trial detainee had a particular vulnerability to suicide, despite the detainee’s
intoxication, fluctuating mood, and reported distress about his family situation).  See also
Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1026-27 (holding that intoxication does not create an issue of material
fact regarding a particular risk of suicide).
Appellants also argue that the testimony of Officers Gablick and Peck raise a disputed
factual issue that should have precluded summary judgment.  Estate’s Br. at 21-22.  That
argument is similarly without merit.  The district court realized that the issue of whether Officer
Gablick informed Officer Peck that Puza’s mood was erratic and that Puza had been drinking is
immaterial because Puza’s conduct was simply insufficient to establish a strong likelihood that
he would harm himself.  Although we are not unsympathetic to this very tragic incident,  the law
is clear that the evidence that plaintiffs produced was not sufficient to defeat the defendants’
4motions for summary judgment.
Moreover, even if plaintiffs could satisfy the first requirement for their cause of action
under § 1983, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the record would still not support
a finding that the correction officers “knew or should have known” of Puza’s risk of suicide.  See 
2007 WL 2852343, at *6-9.  Plaintiffs’ claim that the officers should have known of Puza’s
intent to kill himself is not convincing because the record does not establish that the “strong
likelihood of suicide [was] so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
preventative action.”  Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1025 (citation and internal quotations omitted).]
II.
A municipality is liable under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury . . . .”  Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
However, the district court correctly concluded that the conclusory statements in plaintiffs’
expert’s report were  insufficient to establish the deliberate indifference of Carbon County.  See
Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 325.  
We also conclude that the district court was correct in holding that plaintiffs did not
establish that CRA had a clear duty to prevent Puza’s suicide.  2007 WL 2852343, at *3-4. 
Without a clear duty or special relationship, the general rule under Pennsylvania law is that
“liability cannot be imposed upon third parties for another’s suicide.”  Id. at 3 (citing McPeake v.
Cannon, 553 A.2d 439, 440-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).  
III.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the order of the district court granting
summary judgment to the defendants.
